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JUDICIAL SELECTION AND THE SEARCH
FOR MIDDLE GROUND
Charles Gardner Geyh*
INTRODUCTION
This Article seeks to transcend perennial election versus appoint-
ment debates—including debates over campaign finance and the im-
pact of “dark money”—by taking a closer look at why judicial
selection is a contentious mess and discussing how it might be fixed.
First, I present the case for elective and appointive systems.  Second, I
show that the arguments for each system are exaggerated or flawed.
Third, I explore why it has been hard for proponents of each system to
perceive and acknowledge those exaggerations and flaws, and propose
ways to narrow the divide.  Although the divide can and should be
narrowed, I conclude that it cannot be eliminated altogether.  Ulti-
mately, which system is “best” will unavoidably turn on which selec-
tion system’s core values take precedence in a given state at a given
time.
I. THE ARGUMENTS
There are at least five selection systems that states employ (not
counting sub-variations): gubernatorial appointment; legislative ap-
pointment; partisan contested election; non-partisan contested elec-
tion; and merit selection, with or without retention elections.1  There
are perennial skirmishes over the relative merits of these five systems,
but the entrenched battle line is drawn between elections and appoint-
ments, and whether contested popular elections ought to be the pri-
mary means by which judges are chosen.  In effect, that pits
gubernatorial appointment and merit selection systems against parti-
san and non-partisan election systems (with the two states that still
* John F. Kimberling Professor of Law, Indiana University Maurer School of Law.  I would
like to thank Priya Purohit for her research assistance and Rita Eads for her administrative
support.
1. Merit selection systems feature a nominating commission that screens the pool of judicial
aspirants and presents the governor with a short list of nominees, from which the judge makes an
appointment.  In many jurisdictions, judges so selected subsequently run unopposed in periodic
retention elections, and are permitted to serve for an additional term if they garner majority (or
in some states, supermajority) support.
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employ legislative appointment processes making infrequent bids to
join the fracas).
A. The Role of the Judge in American Government
1. The Brief for Appointed Judiciaries
The American form of litigation, in which adversaries square off
against each other in front of a judge who officiates the contest by
applying a preexisting body of rules to the end of declaring a victor,
conjures an obvious sports analogy.  The American Bar Association’s
Division on Public Education explains that “[j]udges are like umpires
in baseball or referees in football or basketball.”2  “Like the ump,” the
ABA elaborates, judges “call ‘em as they see ‘em, according to the
facts and law—without regard to which side is popular (no home field
advantage), without regard to who is ‘favored,’ without regard for
what the spectators want, and without regard to whether the judge
agrees with the law.”3  In his 2005 Senate confirmation testimony,
Chief Justice John Roberts likewise analogized judges to umpires, for
the purpose of highlighting the limited role judges play in adjudica-
tion.  “Umpires don’t make the rules,” then-Judge Roberts cautioned;
rather, “they apply them.”4  Thus, in his view, “The role of umpire and
judge is critical,” because “[t]hey make sure everybody plays by the
rules, but it is a limited role.”5
If judges are like umpires, then subjecting judges to popular elec-
tion is incompatible with their role.  In 1996, U.S. Supreme Court Jus-
tice John Paul Stevens gave a speech in which he likened the practice
of electing judges to “allowing football fans to elect referees”—a prac-
tice that he condemned as “profoundly unwise.”6  If we want umpires
to “call ‘em as they see ‘em,” then letting the fans decide whether an
ump keeps his job is a bad idea because it will motivate umpires to
make popular calls, rather than correct ones.  The same logic applies
to judges.  If we want judges to “make sure everybody plays by the
rules,” then subjecting judges to popular election is a bad idea because
it will motivate them to disregard the rules to avoid unpopular out-
2. How Courts Work, ABA, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/resources/
law_related_education_network/how_courts_work/judge_role.html.
3. Id.
4. Chief Justice Roberts Statement—Nomination Process, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www
.uscourts.gov/educational-resources/educational-activities/chief-justice-roberts-statement-nomi-
nation-process.
5. Id.
6. Justice Stevens Criticizes Election of Judges, WASH. POST (Aug. 4, 1996), https://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1996/08/04/justice-stevens-criticizes-election-of-judges/e2d1eb58-
75c2-4165-bec9-e4a6b680c2cc/?utm_term=.4cdf31eecb07.
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comes that could jeopardize the judges’ tenures.  Social science data
support the conclusion that impending elections influence the deci-
sions judges make.  One Pennsylvania study found that judges running
for reelection imposed sentences on criminal defendants that were, on
average, several months longer than at other times.7
2. The Brief For Elected Judiciaries
Eighteenth century civics imagined independent judges aloft on
benches and clothed in ermine robes symbolizing their purity of pur-
pose, who issued crystalline divinations of law that sparkled unob-
scured by baser influences that cloud the thinking of mere mortals.
We have learned some things in the intervening centuries that cast
doubt upon this idea.
First, American judges are not above the political fray, but part of
it.  They are powerful people, whose decisions are fraught with policy
implications that affect our lives, liberty, and property.  Judges
breathe meaning into ambiguously worded laws.  In the areas of torts,
contracts, and property, they make the common law.  Their interpreta-
tions of legislative enactments can take statutes in directions their
makers never intended.  Their interpretations of constitutions can ob-
literate the validity of statutes altogether.  Their decisions have
prompted vituperative partisan debate, sparked generations of politi-
cal protest, and catalyzed the Civil War.
Second, the law is not mathematics, in which case outcomes are dic-
tated by mechanistic application of clear rules to known facts.  The
reason parties litigate cases all the way to the Supreme Court is be-
cause the relevant facts and law are uncertain enough to support dif-
fering results.  Hence, the rulings judges issue in difficult cases and the
resulting legal policies judges make, are not science, but art, that re-
quire the exercise of discretion and judgment.
Third, judges are people, who have varying perspectives on the
world that they develop—perspectives that guide their moral com-
pass, inform their conception of justice, and fuel their ideological incli-
nations.  Those perspectives are influenced by their upbringing,
education, life experience, religion, race, gender, ethnicity, and politi-
cal affiliation.  The evidence is overwhelming that the policy perspec-
tives unelected judges cultivate inform the discretion and judgment
they exercise when deciding cases.  Bluntly put, independent judges
are policy-makers in robes.  Political scientists who have generated
7. Gregory A. Huber & Sanford C. Gordon, Accountability and Coercion: Is Justice Blind
when It Runs for Office? 48 AM. J. POLI. SCI. 247, 248 (2004).
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and reviewed the data have coined the phrase “myth of legality” to
characterize stubborn and persistent adherence to the debunked pro-
position that independent judges disregard extralegal influences and
follow the law.8  Additionally, many of the same political scientists
have developed an “attitudinal model” to show that the rulings judges
make are better explained with reference to a judge’s ideological atti-
tudes than operative law.9  Chris Bonneau and Melinda Gann Hall
punctuate the point concisely, “Although it is the modern equivalent
of declaring that the emperor has no clothes to say so, politically as-
tute observers fully recognize that the basic political preferences of
judges influence their votes.”10
Given the inevitability of ideological and other extralegal influences
on judicial decision-making, independence from electoral accountabil-
ity does not free judges to uphold the law; it untethers them to do
whatever they please.  Insofar as the law has intrinsic meaning, ap-
pointed judges are liberated to disregard that meaning and act upon
their personal feelings and ideological preferences.  Insofar as the law
lacks intrinsic meaning, appointive systems dictate that the eye of the
elites trumps the eye of the electorate, which is antithetical to the
principles of a representative democracy.
Social science data reveal that judges decide cases differently in the
shadow of impending elections, which shows that judicial elections
work as intended.  The specter of future elections influences judges to
exercise their judgment and discretion with reference to the policy
preferences of the electorate, instead of their own idiosyncratic ideo-
logical biases.  This state of affairs, in which judges check their own
impulses and take the views of their voters into account when making
legal policy is democracy in action, and wholly compatible with the
rule of law.  As Bonneau and Hall conclude:
We think it far better for justices to draw upon public perceptions
and the prevailing state political climate when resolving difficult dis-
putes than to engage in the unfettered pursuit of their own personal
preferences.  In fact, strategic contingencies should bring justices
into line with the rule of law rather than negate it.11
8. John M. Scheb II & William Lyons, The Myth of Legality and Public Evaluation of the
Supreme Court, 81 SOC. SCI. Q. 928 (2000).
9. JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL
MODEL 73 (1993).
10. CHRIS BONNEAU & MELINDA GANN HALL, IN DEFENSE OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 14
(2009).
11. Id. at 15.
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B. The Particular Merits and Demerits of Elective
and Appointive Systems
1. The Brief for Appointed Judiciaries
Beyond the core problem that subjecting judges to electoral ac-
countability undermines the umpire-judge’s ability to make indepen-
dent, impartial, and sometimes unpopular calls consistent with the
operative facts and law, is the related concern that voters lack the ca-
pacity to hold judges accountable in acceptable ways.  There are three
related problems.
The first problem is competence.  Judges parse relevant language in
constitutions, statutes, ordinances, administrative rules, and case pre-
cedent, to determine, as impartially as possible, what the law requires
before applying that law to resolve disputes between parties.  That re-
quires specialized legal training and experience.  Every state estab-
lishes the minimum qualifications necessary for judicial officers and
requires that judges of general jurisdiction be lawyers.  Without spe-
cialized training, voters lack the competence to assess whether judges
are doing their jobs well.
A second problem is ignorance.  Without legal training to make an
independent assessment of whether judicial candidates exhibit the
skills necessary to interpret and apply the law competently, voters
must rely on their general knowledge of courts and judges, and the
more specific information they can glean about a given race.  Their
general state of knowledge is woeful.  One author has summarized the
litany of deplorables in an article about voter ignorance in judicial
elections:12 Fewer than fifty percent of Americans could name the
three branches of government—fewer, one infamous survey reported,
than could name the Three Stooges; two-thirds of the public could not
identify a single member of the U.S. Supreme Court and fewer than
three percent of American teenagers could identify the Chief Justice;
most survey respondents were unable to identify any state judge at
any level of their court system; and a majority was unaware that their
state even had a constitution.13
A third capacity-related problem is apathy.  Highly motivated vot-
ers might inform themselves sufficiently to overcome incompetence
and ignorance barriers, but “highly motivated” does not describe the
average voter in judicial races.  There is a well-documented “roll-off,”
in which an average of twenty-five percent of the voters who appear at
12. Id. at 13.
13. Id.
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the polls do not cast a ballot in the judicial races.14  One explanation is
“ballot fatigue,” which is a polite way of saying that after standing in
the booth for two minutes, voters do not regard the judicial races as
important enough to merit an additional thirty seconds of their lives.
A second explanation is that voters forego participating in judicial
races because they have not acquired enough information about the
candidates to make an intelligent choice.  Either way, the result is the
same; a majority of eligible voters rarely summons the enthusiasm to
vote in judicial races.
Insofar as highly competitive judicial races, replete with big money
and attack advertising, have the potential to grab voter attention and
diminish roll-off, they do so at the expense of the judiciary’s legiti-
macy.  Former U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor has
described judicial elections in the modern era as “tawdry and embar-
rassing,”15 and has warned that “[t]he public is growing increasingly
skeptical of elected judges in particular,” whom it has come to regard
as “just politicians in robes.”16 Justice O’Connor added that this bodes
ill for the legitimacy of the judiciary generally, because “[d]istrust of
the judiciary in any jurisdiction becomes distrust of the judiciary in all
jurisdictions.”17
Campaign finance exacerbates underlying legitimacy problems.
Competitive elections are bankrolled by campaign contributions and
independent expenditures from individuals and groups with a vested
interest in the outcomes of cases that the candidates will decide as
judges.  There is a widely documented correlation between the cam-
paign support judicial candidates receive and the decisions they later
make.  One study of 470 justices spanning 28,000 cases across multiple
states found that for “judges elected in partisan elections, contribu-
tions from various interest groups have a statistically significant rela-
tionship with the probability that judges vote for litigants that the
interest groups favor.”18  Other studies have replicated these results in
states that select judges via partisan and non-partisan elections, in-
cluding Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Montana,
14. Lawrence Baum, Judicial Elections and Judicial Independence: The Voter’s Perspective, 64
OH. ST. L.J. 13, 19 (2003) (discussing data from unpublished paper by Melinda Gann Hall).
15. John Schwartz, Effort Begun to End Voting for Judges, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2009), http://
www.nytimes.com/2009/12/24/us/24judges.html.
16. James Podgers, O’Connor on Judicial Elections: ‘They’re Awful. I Hate Them,” ABA
JOURNAL (May 9, 2009), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/oconnorv_chemerinsky_sound
_warnings_at_aba_conference_about_the_dangers_of_s/.
17. Id.
18. Joanna Shepherd, Money, Politics, and Impartial Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 623, 669 (2009).
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Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wisconsin.19  One researcher de-
scribed the correlation he found as “remarkably close”;20 another con-
cluded that the contributions judges receive “directly affect judicial
decisionmaking”;21 and two more inferred a “quid pro quo relation-
ship between contributors and votes.”22
When interest groups give candidates piles of money to win elec-
tions, and those candidates later cast votes in favor of their benefac-
tors, one need not be pathologically suspicious to think that something
fishy is going on.  Seventy-six percent of the public and a surprising
forty-six percent of judges “believe that campaign contributions have
at least some influence on judges’ decisions.”23  As Justice O’Connor
has warned, “This crisis of confidence in the judiciary is real and grow-
ing.  Left unaddressed, the perception that justice is for sale will un-
dermine the rule of law that the courts are supposed to uphold.”24 It is
telling, that in the aftermath of a bruising, $9 million Illinois Supreme
19. Stephen J. Ware, Money, Politics and Judicial Decisions: A Case Study of Arbitration Law
in Alabama, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 583 (2002) (Alabama); Eric Waltenburg & Charles Lopeman,
Tort Decisions and Campaign Dollars, 28 SOUTHEASTERN POL. REV. 241 (2000) (Alabama, Ken-
tucky, Ohio); Matias Iaryczower & Matthew Shum, Money in Judicial Politics: Individual Contri-
butions and Collective Decisions (2012), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1998
895 (Alabama, Louisiana, Michigan, Montana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, Wisconsin); Daman
M. Cann, Justice for Sale? Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decisionmaking, 7 STATE POLIT-
ICS & POL’Y Q. 281 (2007) (Georgia); Vernon V. Palmer, The Recusal of American Judges in the
Post-Caperton Era: An Empirical Assessment of the Risk of Actual Bias in Decisions Involving
Campaign Contributors (2010), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1721665
(Louisiana); Chris M. Bonneau & Damon M. Cann, The Effect of Campaign Contributions on
Judicial Decisionmaking (2009), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1337668
(Michigan, Texas); Amon McLeod, Bidding for Justice: A Case Study About the Effect of Cam-
paign Contributions on Judicial Decision-Making, 85 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 385 (2008) (Michi-
gan); Adam Liptak & Janet Roberts, Tilting the Scales?: The Ohio Experience; Campaign Cash
Mirrors a High Court Ruling, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2006), http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage
.html?res=9A06E7D81730F932A35753C1A9609C8B63&pagewanted=all (Ohio); Madhavi Mc-
Call, The Politics of Judicial Elections: The Influence of Campaign Contributions on the Voting
Patterns of Texas Supreme Court Justices, 1994-1997, 31 POL. & POL’Y 314 (2003) (Texas);
Mondhavi McCall & Michael McCall, Campaign Contributions, Judicial Decisions, and the Texas
Supreme Court, 90 JUDICATURE 214 (2007) (Texas) (A Nevada study found no correlation, and
studies in Wisconsin reached mixed results.).
20. Stephen J. Ware, Money, Politics and Judicial Decisions: A Case Study of Arbitration Law
in Alabama, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 583, 584 (2002) (Alabama).
21. Daman M. Cann, Justice for Sale? Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decisionmaking, 7
STATE POLITICS & POL’Y Q. 281 (2007) (Georgia).
22. Bonneau & Cann, supra note 19.
23. JOANNA SHEPARD, JUSTICE AT RISK: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF CAMPAIGN CONTRIBU-
TIONS AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS, AMERICAN CONSTITUTION SOCIETY FOR LAW & POLICY 1
(June 2013), https://www.acslaw.org/ACS%20Justice%20at%20Risk%20(FINAL)%206_10_13
.pdf.
24. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, Foreword, in James Sample et al., The New Politics of Judi-
cial Elections 2000-2009: Decade of Change, Justice at Stake Campaign (Aug. 2010), http://www
.justiceatstake.org/media/cms/JASNPJEDecadeONLINE_8E7FD3FEB83E3.pdf.
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Court race, the victor himself commented that the money spent was
“obscene for a judicial race” and questioned “[h]ow can people have
faith in the system?”25
In my first article on judicial selection, entitled “Why Judicial Elec-
tions Stink,” I sought to distill the litany of problems associated with
judicial elections down to their essence, in four-parts—“the Axiom of
80.”26  Up to 80% of registered voters do not vote in judicial elec-
tions.27  Up to 80% of the public that does vote in judicial elections
cannot identify the candidates for whom they voted.28  At least 80%
of the public think that the campaign contributions in elections influ-
ence judicial decision-making.29  And yet around 80% of the public
still supports judicial elections.30  On the last point, however, I pre-
dicted that the legitimacy-threatening features of judicial elections
would cause public support to erode over time.31
This profusion of problems with elected judiciaries disappears if
judges are appointed.  Once appointed, judges retain the indepen-
dence necessary to call balls and strikes without fear of reprisal for
making unpopular decisions.  The task of appointing judges is vested
in the hands of elected officials or commissions with the time, interest,
and expertise to select capable and qualified people for the job.  And
without judicial races to bankroll, interest groups are denied the op-
portunity to peddle influence via campaign contributions.
2. The Brief for Elected Judiciaries
A significant majority of the American public favors an elected ju-
diciary because it promotes judicial accountability.  Political scientist
James Gibson has shown that elections enhance the judiciary’s legiti-
macy because the public is more likely to accept judicial decisions with
which it disagrees if those decisions are made by elected judges.32
Conversely, research has revealed that appointment processes can
damage the judiciary’s legitimacy.  In the federal system, fractious
25. Tort Reformers Score Victories in Judicial Races, INSURANCE J., (Nov. 22, 2004), http://
www.insurancejournal.com/magazines/features/2004/11/22/49934.htm.
26. Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 OH. ST. L.J. 43 (2003).
27. Id. at 52.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. JAMES GIBSON, ELECTING JUDGES: THE SURPRISING EFFECTS OF CAMPAIGNING ON JUDI-
CIAL LEGITIMACY 3 (2012).
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confirmation battles diminish public respect for the courts to the ex-
tent that they cast judicial nominees as naked political actors.33
The new politics of judicial elections has enabled judicial races to
realize their potential more fully.  Demographic changes, most nota-
bly the decline and fall of Democratic Party control in southern states,
have created new opportunities for interparty competition.  State
courts have become forums of choice for litigating contentious social
issues.  Changes in appellate structure have limited state supreme
court dockets to fewer, often more controversial cases.34  The trial bar
and business community have made state courts a battlefield in their
struggle to control tort liability and reform.35  These developments,
when coupled with the role of courts in helping or hindering the “war
on crime,”36 have elevated the political profile of state courts and the
cases they decide. That, in turn, has heightened political interest in
judicial races, which has generated more competition for judicial seats,
which has funneled more money into judicial races, which has bought
more advertising to better inform the electorate about the races,
which has piqued voter interest, which has decreased voter roll-off at
the polls.37  These benefits all weigh in favor of judicial elections.
Moreover, research reveals that voters draw relatively sophisticated
distinctions between candidates, by favoring quality candidates with
prior judicial experience in races for open seats (where support for the
more experienced candidate cannot be attributed to the advantages of
incumbency).38
When it comes to judicial elections and the role they play in pro-
moting democracy, partisan systems deserve special mention.  Party
affiliation conveys information about the candidates’ philosophies and
33. JAMES L. GIBSON & GREGORY A. CALDEIRA, CITIZENS, COURTS, AND CONFIRMA-
TIONS: POSITIVITY THEORY AND THE JUDGMENTS OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 2 (2009).
34. Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Supreme Court’s Plenary Docket,
58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 737, 751 (2001); G. Alan Tarr, State Judicial Selection and Judicial
Independence, App. D at 6–7, in AM. BAR ASSN, JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY: REPORT OF THE
COMM’N ON THE 21ST CENTURY JUDICIARY (2003).
35. Emily Heller & Mark Ballard, Hard-Fought, Big Money Judicial Races: U.S. Chamber of
Commerce Enters Fray with Ad Money, NAT’L L.J. (Nov. 6, 2000), at 42.
36. Traciel V. Reid, The Politicalization of Retention Elections: Lessons from the Defeat of
Justices Lanphier and White, 83 JUDICATURE 68, 70–74 (1999); Amanda Frost & Stefanie Lind-
quist, Countering the Majoritarian Difficulty, 96 VA. L. REV. 719, 749 (2010) (“An incumbent
judge’s decisions in criminal cases are easy targets for his opponents in the next election cycle,
who can use almost any decision favorable to a criminal defendant, no matter how legally defen-
sible, as grounds for portraying the incumbent as ‘soft on crime.’”).
37. BONNEAU & HALL, supra note 10.  This is essentially a one-sentence summary of Bonneau
and Hall’s argument in defense of judicial elections—an argument they support with extensive
reference to the social science literature, much of which they have authored.
38. Id. at 98.
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ideological orientations that assist voters in making informed choices
and reduces roll-off relative to non-partisan races.  Partisan races tend
to be more competitive, with fewer uncontested seats, and a higher
rate of incumbent turnover, which are hallmarks of a healthy demo-
cratic process.  Non-partisan races do not serve their intended purpose
of eliminating political party control over judicial selection; rather,
they are often non-partisan in name only and subject to partisan influ-
ence and control behind the scenes.  As a consequence, stripping can-
didates of party identifiers serves only to disable candidates from
differentiating themselves in the eyes of the voters.39
Appointive systems, in contrast, fail at every turn.  First, and per-
haps foremost, so-called “merit selection” systems do not produce
judges who are more meritorious.  One study from the 1980s found no
discernible differences in the quality of judges chosen by different se-
lection systems.40  In a more recent and extensive study of the subject,
Greg Goelzhauser reached a similar conclusion: “Election un-
derperforms merit selection and appointment on certain measures of
educational quality and performance,” but overall, “the empirical re-
sults suggest that selections yield similarly qualified state supreme
court justices.”41  One study conducted by a trio of distinguished law
professors made an “uncertain empirical case,” but a case neverthe-
less, for elected judiciaries that rested on data leading the authors to
conclude that elected judges were more productive and independent
than their appointed counterparts.42  Accordingly, Bonneau and Hall
concluded from this study, “judges chosen in elections, particularly in
partisan elections, are better than judges chosen by other methods.”43
Second, appointive systems generally, and merit selection systems
in particular, have failed to keep the politics out of judicial selection.
As Bonneau and Hall argue, one need look no further than the U.S.
Supreme Court appointments process to debunk the notion that judi-
cial appointments are apolitical events.44  Merit selection systems
delegate to unaccountable commissions the task of creating a candi-
date pool from which governors select judges.  The commissions are
39. See generally CHRIS W. BONNEAU & DAMON M. CANN, VOTERS’ VERDICTS: CITIZENS,
CAMPAIGNS, AND INSTITUTIONS IN STATE SUPREME COURT ELECTIONS (2015).
40. Henry R. Glick & Craig F. Emmert, Selection Systems and Judicial Characteristics: The
Recruitment of State Supreme Court Judges, 70 JUDICATURE 228, 235 (1987).
41. GREG GOELZHAUSER, CHOOSING STATE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: MERIT SELECTION
AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF INSTITUTIONAL REFORM 110 (2016).
42. Stephen J. Choi et al., Professionals or Politicians: The Uncertain Case for an Elected
Rather than Appointed Judiciary, 26 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 290 (2010).
43. BONNEAU & HALL, supra note 10, at 137.
44. Id. at 137–38.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\67-2\DPL206.txt unknown Seq: 11  2-MAR-18 15:01
2018] JUDICIAL SELECTION 343
typically dominated by lawyers and judges, who deliberate in black
boxes impervious to public scrutiny.45  Researchers have found that
these commissions are subject to a variety of political influences.  An
early study found evidence of “panel-stacking,” in which commissions
forced the governor’s hand by creating candidate pools limited to one
viable choice, and “logrolling,” in which commissioners traded their
support for a fellow-commissioner’s preferred candidate in exchange
for reciprocal favors.46  A substantial minority of commissioners has
reported that their commissions were sometimes subject to political
influences,47 and a majority of commission chairs have indicated that
politics entered into their deliberations at least “infrequently.”48  One
study has shown that lawyer-controlled nominating commissions ex-
hibit a selection bias in favor of liberal judicial applicants, which the
author attributes to the liberal-leaning predilections of the bar.49
Third, to the extent that merit selection systems seek to preserve
the pretense of accountability with periodic retention elections, it is no
more than that—a pretense.  Retention elections are dreary by design.
Who wants to go to the racetrack to watch a solitary horse run a time
trial to see whether it qualifies to do it again next year?  Nobody.
And in the context of retention elections, that means nobody is ener-
gized enough to jeopardize incumbency.  As a consequence, voter roll-
off in retention elections is substantially higher than in contested elec-
tions.50  Additionally, the average support incumbents receive in re-
tention elections is a whopping 75%—far more than the 55-60% that
would qualify as competitive enough to promote accountability.51
C. Arguments for Incremental Reform
Although most disputants in the judicial selection debate align
themselves with arguments for appointive or elective systems, some
advocate incremental reform of elective systems.  One subset of incre-
mentalists is averse to judicial elections, but regards them as inevita-
45. Michael DeBow et al., The Case for Partisan Judicial Elections, FEDERALIST SOC’Y (Jan. 1,
2003), https://fedsoc.org/commentary/publications/the-case-for-partisan-judicial-elections (criti-
cizing merit selection as “a somewhat subterranean process of bar and bench politics, in which
there is little popular control”).
46. RICHARD A. WATSON & RONDAL G. DOWNING, THE POLITICS OF BENCH AND BAR
107–11 (1969).
47. ALLAN ASHMAN & JAMES J. ALFINI, THE KEY TO JUDICIAL MERIT SELECTION: THE NOM-
INATING PROCESS 75 (1974).
48. JOANNE MARTIN, MERIT SELECTION COMMISSIONS: WHAT DO THEY DO? HOW EFFEC-
TIVE ARE THEY? 20–22 (1993).
49. Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The Politics of Merit Selection, 74 MO. L. REV. 675, 676 (2009).
50. BONNEAU & HALL, supra note 10, at 26–28.
51. Id. at 80–81.
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ble, and so focuses on ways to make an undesirable system better.  A
second subset regards judicial elections with ambivalence, agnosti-
cism, or favor, but see room for improvement.  To these ends, three
proposals have gained at least some traction.
First, several states have experimented with systems for publicly fi-
nancing supreme court elections to diminish the delegitimizing if not
corrupting influence of special interest money.  Judicial candidates
have a First Amendment right to solicit financial support from groups
and individuals in privately funded campaigns, but candidates may
agree to refuse campaign contributions from private sources in ex-
change for public monies with which to campaign.  The American Bar
Association’s Commission on Public Financing of Judicial Campaigns
endorsed public financing, concluding that “[t]he more money judges
receive from public sources, the less they will have to raise from pri-
vate groups and individuals who are interested in the outcomes of
cases the judges decide, which will reduce the potential for campaign
contributions to influence judicial behavior and address the public
perception” of such influence.52
Second, many states have sought to address concerns over the real
or perceived influence of campaign contributions on judicial decision-
making by imposing campaign contribution limits and disclosure re-
quirements.53  Modest campaign contributions in amounts too low to
create a reasonable suspicion of influence peddling are harmless, and
serve no purpose beyond showing support for the candidate and the
judiciary of which the candidate is or may become part.  Contribution
limits restrict campaign finance to these innocuous displays of sup-
port.  Disclosure requirements, in turn, dull the blade of influence
peddling by keeping voters apprised of who is contributing to which
candidates, so that voters might hold candidates accountable when the
risk of influence becomes unacceptable.
Third, all states have recusal or disqualification rules that can re-
quire judges to withdraw from cases for campaign-related bias.  Dis-
qualification rules can alleviate problems that arise when campaign-
related events compromise a judge’s impartiality in later cases, by
forcing the judge to withdraw from those cases.  One such problem
has arisen when an issue comes before the court that the judge, as a
judicial candidate, pre-committed to decide in a particular way.
52. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON PUBLIC FINANCING OF JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS, AMERI-
CAN BAR ASSOCIATION 30 (Feb. 2002).
53. For a state by state summary of contribution limits in judicial campaigns, see Judicial Cam-
paigns and Elections, NAT’L CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, http://www.judicialselection.us/judi-
cial_selection/campaigns_and_elections/campaign_financing.cfm?state.
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For example, in 2010, a West Virginia Supreme Court justice dis-
qualified himself (albeit after adverse publicity and angrily) from a
case that challenged the constitutionality of tort reform legislation.
As a judicial candidate, when asked for his views on the legislation, he
declared, “I will not vote to overturn it. I will not vote to change it. I
will not vote to modify it.”54  The justice may have felt that he could
be impartial notwithstanding his prior statements.  However, it seems
unlikely that a party challenging the law could receive an impartial
decision from a judge who had committed himself to rejecting the
claim before it had even been filed.  Hence, the American Bar Associ-
ation’s Model Code of Judicial Conduct provides that if a judge, while
a candidate, “commits or appears to commit . . . to reach a particular
result or rule in a particular way,” the judge is later disqualified from
hearing that case when it comes before the court.55
A second problem that disqualification addresses has arisen when
judges are assigned to hear cases in which a party, or someone closely
affiliated with a party, has given significant financial support to the
judge’s election campaign.  In Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Com-
pany,56 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a West Virginia Supreme
Court justice violated a party’s constitutional right to due process of
law when he refused to disqualify himself from a case in which the
justice had received campaign support from one party’s CEO in
amounts sufficient to create a probability of bias.  The Court empha-
sized that states could avoid due process problems through the simple
expedient of establishing their own disqualification rules that sub-
jected judges to recusal before problems reach constitutional magni-
tude.57  Virtually every state, including West Virginia, has done just
that, by adopting rules requiring judges to disqualify themselves when
their  “impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”58  A number of
states have gone further and crafted specific disqualification rules ap-
plicable to judges who receive campaign support from parties or their
lawyers in amounts and under circumstances that cast doubt on the
judge’s impartiality.
54. Tony Mauro, New Recusal Controversy in West Virginia High Court, BLOG LEGAL TIMES
(Sept. 24, 2010), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2010/09/new-recusal-controversy-in-west-vir-
ginia-high-court.html.
55. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11(A)(5) (2007).
56. 556 U.S. 868, 885 (2009).
57. Id. at 889–90.
58. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11(A) (2007).
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II. EVERYONE IS WRONG
Having described the arguments in Part I, my ambition here is to
show how all sides rely on arguments that are exaggerated or wrong.
A. Elections, Appointments, and the Role of the Judge
Proponents of appointive systems who claim categorically that inde-
pendent judges apply the law like umpires call balls and strikes usually
do not encumber their arguments with recourse to facts.  Like Chief
Justice John Roberts, they are stating principles; they are quoting The
Federalist papers; they are quoting each other.  The inconvenient facts
reveal that these claims are overstated. The so-called “legal model,”
which proceeds on the premise that independent judges set extralegal
influences aside and apply the law, has been tested in studies of the
U.S. Supreme Court and has not fared well.  Research shows what an
overwhelming majority of the public already believes: Supreme Court
justices are profoundly influenced by their ideological predilections.
In a fascinating study of man versus machine, researchers pitted a
computer model against a battery of legal experts and challenged
them both to predict the outcomes of cases in the Supreme Court’s
upcoming term.59  Armed with a handful of factors aimed primarily at
assessing the ideological tilt of the cases, without regard to the specific
legal issue at stake, the computer predicted seventy-five percent of
case outcomes correctly, as compared to fifty-nine percent for the
experts.60
Ironically, judges may  well be like umpires, but not in the way that
Chief Justice Roberts had in mind.  In easy cases, such as, when a wild
pitch hits the batboy, there is no room for discretion or disagreement
and the pitch will be called a ball, which may help to explain why
nearly half of the cases before the Supreme Court are decided by
unanimous vote.  But in close cases (and the Supreme Court’s docket
is top heavy with them), when pitchers seek to paint the corners of the
plate, the game demands that umpires make judgment calls.  In those
situations, calling balls and strikes is, as one major league umpire put
it, “like [interpreting] the Constitution.  The strike zone is a living,
breathing document.”61
59. Theodore W. Ruger et al., The Supreme Court Forecasting Project: Legal and Political
Science Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1150,
1151 (2004).
60. Id. at 1151–52.
61. WHAT’S LAW GOT TO DO WITH IT?: WHAT JUDGES DO, WHY THEY DO IT, AND WHAT’S
AT STAKE 85 (Charles Gardner Geyh ed., 2011) (quoting Bruce Weber, Umpires v. Judges, N.Y.
TIMES (July 11, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/12/weekinreview/12weber.html).
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Insofar as independent judges exercise discretion influenced by
their policy preferences, it lends credence to the argument of election
proponents that judges are policymakers in robes who, like policy-
makers in other branches of government, should be constrained by the
people they serve.  Election opponents point to data showing that
state judges decide differently when elections approach, as if that is a
flaw of elective systems, when it may be a feature.  Who is to say that
the rule of law is not better served when elections are impending and
judges are motivated to set their idiosyncratic, ideological predilec-
tions aside and allow the views of the many to inform the views of the
one?
But this pro-election argument is overstated too.  First, it proceeds
based on the problematic assumption that we can generalize from
studies of U.S. Supreme Court justices to conclude that appointed
judges categorically are driven by their ideological predilections and
unconstrained by law.62  Unlike U.S. Supreme Court justices, most ap-
pointed judges occupy “lower courts.”  As such, they are foot soldiers
constrained by the precedent of the U.S. Supreme Court itself.  Not
surprisingly, researchers have found that the influence of ideology on
judicial decision-making is significantly less for federal circuit judges
than for justices on the U.S. Supreme Court.63  Another study has
found that state supreme courts followed binding U.S. Supreme Court
precedent less frequently than federal circuit court judges, and attrib-
uted the difference to state courts making choices “less likely to gar-
ner public disapproval.”64
Simply summarized, judges are neither umpires nor politicians in
robes and they are both.  With exceptions, disputants in the binary
judicial selection debate have opted against coming to terms with such
complexity.  They have chosen instead to characterize judges as
cartoonish balloons in the service of arguments that are easy to inflate
and puncture.  That has yielded conversations both colorful and fes-
tive, but results that are not especially durable.
62. BONNEAU & HALL, supra note 10, at 14–15 (relying on U.S. Supreme Court studies to
support the conclusion that unelected state supreme court justices “engage in the unfettered
pursuit of their own personal preferences”).
63. FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION-MAKING IN THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS 17–18 (2007).
64. Sara C. Benesh & Wendy L. Martinek, Context and Compliance: A Comparison of State
Supreme Courts and the Circuits, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 795, 815–16 (2009).
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B. The Particular Merits and Demerits of Elective
and Appointive Systems
Beyond the foundational question of whether judges are more like
umpires who should be protected from intimidation by the fans or
politicians who should be accountable to their constituents, is a cluster
of more specific arguments relevant to elections.  Is the electorate too
incompetent, ignorant, and apathetic to hold judges accountable in de-
sirable ways?  Does the electoral process undermine the judiciary’s
legitimacy, when judicial candidates are forced to campaign like ordi-
nary politicians, take positions on issues they will decide as judges,
and raise money from individuals and organizations with business
before the courts?  Team appointments shouts “yes!” Team elections
bellow “no!”
Once again, the disputants exaggerate their claims.  When arguing
that voters are too unknowledgeable to hold judges accountable in
meaningful ways, opponents of judicial elections rely on studies that
distort the extent of voter ignorance, with a one-two punch.  First,
those studies often ask open-ended questions that require respondents
to recall information from memory, which is much more difficult than
closed-ended questions that ask respondents to recall information
from a list of options.65  Second, researchers can be unduly exacting in
the criteria they impose for a “correct” answer.  Thus, for example,
one study, which found that only ten percent of the public knew that
William Rehnquist was the Chief Justice of the United States, coded
as “incorrect,” responses that identified him as the “main guy” or
“head honcho” on the Supreme Court.66  When these methodological
flaws are corrected the results change.  For example, one study found
that solid majorities of the American public know that Supreme Court
justices are appointed; that they serve life terms; and that they exer-
cise the power of judicial review.67  These findings led the authors to
conclude that the public knows “far more” about the Supreme Court
than is typically supposed, and that “the American people may in fact
know enough about law and courts to be able to perform their as-
signed function as constituents of the contemporary judicial system in
the United States.”68
65. James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Knowing the Supreme Court? A Reconsideration
of Public Ignorance of the High Court, 71 J. POL. 429, 431–33 (2009).
66. Id. at 432.
67. Id. at 433 (The researchers phrased the judicial review question in terms of whether the
Court had the “last say” on the Constitution.).
68. Id. at 433, 439.
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Studies of voting patterns in state supreme court elections challenge
claims (I, among others, have made) that voters are too ignorant to
make intelligent choices.  Chris Bonneau and Melinda Gann Hall
found that in judicial races for open seats (where neither candidate
possessed an incumbency advantage), candidates with prior judicial
experience performed “almost five percent better than their inexperi-
enced counterparts,” leading them to conclude that “voters in state
supreme court elections make fairly sophisticated candidate-based
evaluations.”69
These comparatively optimistic assessments of voter knowledge and
acumen, however, are exaggerated too.  The basic fact that the U.S.
Supreme Court is comprised of life appointed judges who exercise ju-
dicial review is foundational, and constitutes about as little as one can
know about the Supreme Court and claim to know anything.  When
knowledge of that fact is tested by vivisecting the question into three
subparts70 a majority of respondents can answer each subpart cor-
rectly, but only forty-four percent of respondents correctly answer all
three.  I do not begrudge the authors’ optimistic “glass is forty-four
percent full” conclusion, but there is room to argue that this result
falls short of repudiating concerns about voter ignorance.
Studies testing the public’s knowledge of the U.S. Supreme Court
tell us nothing about their knowledge of state courts, which are the
only courts relevant to a study of judicial elections.  When one of the
researchers who authored the U.S. Supreme Court study asked re-
spondents the same three questions about their state supreme court,
he found that twenty-four percent knew their state supreme court jus-
tices were elected; thirty-three percent knew that the justices served
fixed terms; forty-six percent knew that the court exercised judicial
review; and just over seven percent knew the answer to all three—
figures the author acknowledges are “dismally low.”71
Pervasive public ignorance of basic facts about state court systems
does not necessarily mean that voters are ignorant of issues relevant
to judicial races.  This counterpoint is corroborated by Bonneau and
Hall’s study, which shows that the electorate favors “quality” candi-
dates with prior judicial experience.  But they climb out onto a limb of
data too slender to support the weight of their conclusions.  Their
finding that judicial candidates with prior judicial experience garner
69. BONNEAU & HALL, supra note 10, at 133.
70. Are the justices appointed? Do they receive life tenure? Do they exercise judicial review?
71. James L. Gibson, Judging the Politics of Judging: Are Politicians in Robes Inevitably Illegit-
imate?, in WHAT’S LAW GOT TO DO WITH IT?: WHAT JUDGES DO, WHY THEY DO IT, AND
WHAT’S AT STAKE 293 (Charles Gardner Geyh ed., 2011).
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nearly five percent more voter support than those without, negates
assertions that voter choices are random.  But whether that finding
supports the conclusion that voters make “fairly sophisticated, evalua-
tions” of candidate quality is another matter.  We do not know
whether voters are even aware that the candidates they prefer have
prior judicial experience.  They may vote for those candidates simply
because voters recognize the candidates’ names,72 or because those
candidates are more accomplished campaigners by virtue of having
run and won judicial races in the past.  Neither of these considerations
have anything to do with the candidate’s judicial qualifications.  Of
those who are aware of the candidates’ prior judicial experience, some
may mistakenly assume or be misled into thinking that they are in-
cumbents with work experience more relevant than is the case.73  We
know that candidates with prior judicial experience receive more
voter support.  Whether that is because voters make “fairly sophisti-
cated” choices based on candidate quality, or because candidates with
prior judicial experience enjoy other tactical advantages irrelevant to
their qualifications, we do not know.
Exaggerated claims likewise color the public discussion of voter ap-
athy and indifference.  A claim I made in another article, that as much
as 80% of the public lacks the enthusiasm to vote in judicial elections,
is technically true in some races if one combines the percentage of
eligible voters who appear at the polls but do not cast ballots in judi-
cial races with the much higher percentage of eligible voters who do
not show up at all.  Conflating voter apathy generally with voter apa-
thy in judicial races specifically yields a flashy data point that over-
states the apathy for which judicial races can fairly be held
responsible.  The more relevant figure is the 25% average roll-off in
judicial races, but even that is misleading insofar as it homogenizes
dramatic variations in roll-off across the states by combining the data
from partisan, non-partisan, and retention election states.  In partisan
races, roll-off averages only 11.2%,74 which reveals the intuitive truth
that voter apathy declines if election campaigns are more interesting.
Of course, expensive, hotly contested, partisan races make election
campaigns more interesting.
72. This explanation is consonant with the impetus for the merit selection movement, which
was premised in part on the concern that name recognition, rather than qualifications influenced
voter decision-making in contested judicial elections.
73. Candidates with prior judicial experience can mislead voters by identifying themselves as
judges which invites the false inference that they are incumbents. CHARLES GARDNER GEYH ET
AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS §11.09[2] (5th ed. 2013).
74. BONNEAU & HALL, supra note 10, at 98.
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Before we declare the apathy problem solved, it is worth noting that
the healing powers of the partisan election elixir have been over-
hyped.  First, the energizing effects of contested partisan elections are
not felt categorically, but are confined to state supreme courts; roll-off
appears to be relatively incurable in lower court races, where candi-
dates struggle to attract voter attention.75  Second, a significant num-
ber of states provide for straight party ticket voting, whereby voters
can cast their vote for all the Republicans or all the Democrats on the
ballot by pulling a single lever.  In states with partisan judicial elec-
tions, the straight-ticket option decreases roll-off for reasons having
nothing to do with diminished voter apathy in relation to the judicial
races.76  Conversely, in states with non-partisan and retention elec-
tions, the straight-ticket option increases roll-off by enabling voters to
leave the booth after pulling the master lever before voting in the
nonpartisan races,77 which exaggerates the extent to which partisan
elections diminish voter apathy relative to other systems.  Third, parti-
san elections decrease but do not eliminate roll-off.  Voter apathy thus
remains a legitimate although diminished concern, and raises the
question of whether the benefits of the partial cure to voter apathy
that fractious, partisan elections offer, outweigh other costs that parti-
san elections incur.
Finally, claims relating to the impact of judicial elections on court
legitimacy have also been skewed.  The pervasive rant that the new
politics of judicial elections undermines public confidence in the
courts has, for the most part, been based on unsupported speculation
that the impact of noisier and costlier judicial elections on public sup-
port for the courts cannot be good.  But these data-free observations
often overlook an important and intuitively sensible point that re-
search confirms: people have more confidence in governmental insti-
tutions over which they exert a measure of control.  Hence, judicial
elections enhance legitimacy.  Although public confidence in the judi-
ciary can be shaken by attack advertising and the perception that cam-
paign contributions buy influence, a body of research reveals that
those concerns diminish but do not override the legitimizing effects of
elections.78
75. Matthew Streb & Brian Frederick, When Money Can’t Encourage Participation: Campaign
Spending and Roll-off in Low Visibility Judicial Elections, 33 POLITICAL BEHAVIOR 665 (2011).
76. Herbert M. Kritzer, Roll-Off in State Court Elections: The Impact of the Straight-Ticket
Voting Option, 4 J.L. & CTS. 409, 410 (2016).
77. Chris Bonneau & Eric Loepp, Getting Things Straight: The Effects of Ballot Design and
Electoral Structure on Voter Participation, 34 ELECTORAL STUDIES 119, 122 (2014).
78. GIBSON, supra note 32.
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On the flip side, the body of research to which I alluded in the pre-
vious paragraph may have made too much of too little and overstated
its conclusions as a consequence.  That research was generalized from
studies in Kentucky and Pennsylvania.79  A more recent, nationwide
study has found that when judicial races become too contentious, the
delegitimizing costs of elections can exceed the legitimizing benefits,
relative to appointive systems.80
In addition to the issues encircling the relative merits and demerits
of elective systems, there are three additional issues specific to ap-
pointive systems in general and merit selection systems in particular:
(1) Do appointive systems (including merit selection) produce more
qualified judges?, (2) Is merit selection a less politicized alternative to
contested elections?, and (3) Are the retention elections that merit
selection systems employ preferable to contested elections?  Propo-
nents of appointive systems say “yes,” while proponents of elective
systems say “no.”  Once again, the arguments on both sides are over-
stated, unsupported, and sometimes simply wrong.
The essential argument for merit selection systems is that judges are
selected on the basis of “merit,” and are therefore more qualified than
their elected counterparts.  The historical basis for this claim is that
judges chosen by expert commissions dedicated to identifying the best
candidates will yield better qualified judges than elective systems,
where undiscerning voters choose between candidates who made their
way onto the ballot for reasons that have more to do with their skills
as politicians than their credentials as jurists.  However, social science
has exposed such claims as grossly overstated, if not false.  The best
evidence shows that, with insignificant exceptions, elected and ap-
pointed judges are comparably credentialed.81
That said, election proponents may overplay their hand when they
reference this empirical evidence to support the more sweeping con-
clusion that “schemes other than partisan elections fail to improve the
quality of the bench.”82  First, research indicates that merit selection
systems do a better job than contested election systems of producing a
barrel with fewer bad apples, by screening out the least qualified judi-
79. Benjamin Woodson, The Two Opposing Effects of Judicial Elections on Legitimacy Per-
ceptions, 17 STATE POLITICS & POL’Y Q. 24, 28 (2016).
80. Id. at 26–27.
81. GREG GOELZHAUSER, CHOOSING STATE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: MERIT SELECTION
AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF INSTITUTIONAL REFORM 110 (2016).
82. BONNEAU & HALL, supra note 10, at 137.
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cial candidates.83  Second, comparing resumes may be a convenient
way to measure the “quality” of the bench in some sense, but does not
capture the intangibles of judicial temperament essential to good judg-
ing.  Codes of conduct bar judges from being people-pleasers. Judges
“shall not” be “swayed by public clamor or fear of criticism,” “make
any public statement” that could affect a pending case, or “make
pledges, promises or commitments” concerning their decisions as pub-
lic officials.84  Winning elections, however, is all about pleasing peo-
ple, being responsive to clamor and criticism, maintaining open
channels of communication with voters, and making campaign
promises.  This suggests judicial aspirants who seek office via con-
tested elections may lack the necessary judicial temperament more
often than their appointed counterparts.  Additionally, there is evi-
dence from states with mixed systems (which appoint some judges and
elect others) that elected judges are subject to discipline with greater
frequency than their appointed counterparts.85
Finally, election proponents go a step too far when they tout an
“excellent” study upon which they rely to show that elected judges are
“better.”86  In that study, the authors concluded that elected judges
were more “productive” than appointed judges because elected judges
wrote more opinions.87  Additionally, the article asserts the elected
judges were more “independent” because they disagreed with “co-
partisans” on their courts more frequently.88  The number of majority
opinions justices write depends on how many cases they hear, which is
subject to the vagaries of statutory limits on a given court’s discretion
83. Richard A. Watson & Rondal G. Downing, The Politics of the Bench and the Bar, in 33
THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY 154 (1969) (fewer merit selected judges rank in
lowest quality quartile than elected judges).
84. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.4, 2.10 (2007).
85. Malia Reddick, Judging the Quality of Judicial Selection Methods: Merit Selection, Elec-
tions, and Judicial Discipline (2010), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=27310
18 (merit selected judges disciplined less frequently in six of nine jurisdictions studied).
86. BONNNEAU & HALL, supra note 10, at 137 (discussing Stephen J. Choi et al., Professionals
or Politicians: The Uncertain Empirical Case for an Elected Rather than Appointed Judiciary, 26
J. LAW & ECON. 290 (2010)).
87. Choi et al., supra note 42.
88. Id.  The authors also found that the opinions of appointed judges were cited more fre-
quently, which led them to conclude that appointed judges were more “skilled.” Id. at 316
(“Overall, and particularly compared with Election Partisan judges, the models are consistent
with the view that Appointed judges write the best opinions.”).  Insofar as the cases cited in
judicial opinions are selected by clerks who graduated from law school the year before, relying
on those selections as a proxy for the “skill” of the opinion-writers whose cases clerks cite seems
a dubious extrapolation.  A safer conclusion may be that such findings reflect a tendency to cite
courts and opinion-writers perceived as more prestigious, which may or may not be a reflection
of skill.  David Klein & Darby Morrisroe, The Prestige and Influence of Individual Judges on the
U.S. Courts of Appeals, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 371, 391 (1999).
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to decline review of appeals that litigants file—a factor beyond the
justices’ control, for which the authors did not account.  Moreover,
critical to their conclusion that elected judges were more productive
was the finding that they wrote more concurring and dissenting opin-
ions.89  This conclusion is based on the contestable premise that writ-
ing fewer concurrences and dissents is the mark of a “lazy” judge,90
when it is at least as likely the mark of a less quarrelsome judge who
strives to govern by consensus on a collegial court.
Measuring judicial independence with reference to whether judges
are, in effect, independent from each other is even more problem-
atic.91  The relevant independence is the independence of judges from
those who control judicial selection and retention.  When elected
judges part company with each other more frequently via concur-
rences and dissents it is more likely the mark of dependent judges
strategically tailoring their views in the shadow of impending elec-
tions, to preserve voter support.
In addition to claims that it would select judges with greater
“merit,” merit selection was devised as a means to depoliticize judicial
selection relative to preexisting methods.  In lieu of the bare-knuckle
politics of contested elections or the politics of cronyism inherent in
traditional appointive systems, merit selection promised a new way:
judicial selection by expert, apolitical commissions.  The claim that
merit selection systems takes the politics out of judicial selection is
rooted in the unsupported assumption that a commission of unelected
lawyers, judges, and laypeople will make apolitical assessments of ap-
plicants for judicial office.  What evidence we have shows this assump-
tion is flawed.  There have been reports of vote-trading or log-rolling
within commissions, and commission manipulation of candidate pools
that effectively disempowered the governor by presenting him or her
with a list of nominees that include only one viable choice.92  Moreo-
ver, commissioners have reported being subject to political pressure.
In an early multistate study of merit selection commissions, forty-nine
percent of commissioners reported that political influences or consid-
erations were introduced into commission deliberations at least
infrequently.93
89. Id. at 296.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 297.
92. ALLAN ASHMAN & JAMES J. ALFINI, THE KEY TO JUDICIAL MERIT SELECTION: THE NOM-
INATING PROCESS  75 (1974); JOANNE MARTIN, MERIT SELECTION COMMISSIONS: WHAT DO
THEY DO? HOW EFFECTIVE ARE THEY? 20–22 (1993).
93. ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra note 92.
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Election proponents expose the weaknesses of claims that merit se-
lection depoliticizes judicial selection, but in so doing take their argu-
ments a step too far.  In the most comprehensive and compelling
argument to date for partisan election of state supreme court justices,
the authors characterize the claim that “appointments schemes take
the politics out of judicial selection” as a “myth” and assert that “ap-
pointment systems merely relocate politics from the electorate to po-
litical elites.”94  The one modern example they discuss in support of
this conclusion is the U.S. Supreme Court.95  Such an argument pro-
ceeds on the dubious assumption that the partisan politics in play
when the U.S. Senate confirms a justice to serve on the most visible
and powerful court in the nation is comparable to when the Maine
Senate confirms a gubernatorial nominee, or the North Dakota gover-
nor appoints a justice from the from the commission pool.
Claims that merit selection commissions exhibit partisan bias are
likewise suspect. The one significant study purporting to show ideo-
logical bias by nominating commissions, proceeded from the premise
that lawyers are more liberal than the general population, and found
that lawyer-dominated nominating commissions generated short lists
of nominees who were more liberal than the general population.96  It
thus concluded that nominating commissions exhibit a liberal bias.97
Unfortunately, the study does not compare the ideological make-up
of the applicant pool to the ideological make-up of the nominees se-
lected from that pool.  If the author’s assumption is correct, that law-
yers are more liberal than the general population, then one would
expect the applicant pool, comprised entirely of lawyers, to be more
liberal than the general population as well.  Hypothetically, if fifty-five
percent of the applicant pool is liberal, and fifty-five percent of com-
mission nominees are liberal, it does not imply that nominating com-
missions are playing politics, but implies that politics played no part in
commission review.  Under these circumstances, one may still fault
merit selection systems for failing to nominate a disproportionate per-
centage of conservative applicants to compensate for ideological im-
balance in the applicant pool.  If so, however, the fault lies not in
merit selection’s failure to take the politics out of judicial selection,
but its failure to put the politics back in.
Finally, proponents of merit selection argue that the retention elec-
tion component included in many merit selection regimes offers the
94. BONNEAU & HALL, supra note 10, at 137–38.
95. Id.
96. Fitzpatrick, supra note 49.
97. Id.
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best of both worlds: meaningful accountability to the electorate with-
out meaningful encroachment on judicial independence values.  The
unsupported claim that retention elections offer meaningful accounta-
bility is belied by the data, which show that non-retention events are
rare, bordering on apocryphal, with non-retention rates hovering at
one percent.98  At the same time, research reveals that unwarranted
fear of non-retention nonetheless compromises judicial independence
by leading judges to align their votes with electoral preferences as
elections near (albeit to a lesser extent than their counterparts facing
contested elections).99  Hence, retention elections offer the worst of
both worlds—dependence without accountability.
So despairing a conclusion, however, may go too far in the opposite
direction.  A measure of electoral accountability is achieved if the
threat of non-retention leads judges to be mindful of the electorate’s
preferences even if actual non-retention rates are low.  While that re-
sponsiveness evidences a measure of judicial dependence, it is a lesser
measure than in contested elections.  To that extent, retention elec-
tions are neither heaven nor hell on earth, but limbo.
C. Arguments Concerning Incremental Reforms
Finally, there are arguments regarding the merits of incremental re-
forms.  Will public-financing, contribution limits, or disclosure re-
quirements diminish the perception, if not the reality, that justice is
for sale in judicial elections?  Can a rigorous disqualification regime
preserve the integrity of the judicial process by forcing judges to with-
draw from cases in which campaign-related events call their impartial-
ity into question?  Reformers say “yes”; others have their doubts.
1. Public Financing
Public financing proposals can fairly be accused of wishful thinking.
Several states have implemented public financing regimes and none
have succeeded—North Carolina’s experiment being the latest to per-
ish.100  There is chronic public ambivalence over using tax dollars to
sufficiently finance the electioneering of judicial candidates.  Moreo-
ver, public financing regimes cannot abridge the speech of individuals
98. Id. at 684 (state high court non-retention rates at 1%); Michael Dann & Randall M. Han-
sen, Judicial Retention Elections, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1429 (2001) (trial court non-retention
rates at 1%.).
99. Elisha Savchak & A.J. Barghothi, The Influence of Appointment and Retention Constituen-
cies: Testing Strategies of Judicial Decisionmaking, 7 STATE POLITICS & POL’Y Q. 394, 408 (2007).
100. Tripp Huffstetler, RIP: The Death of Publicly Funded Judicial Elections in North Caro-
lina, CAMPELL L. OBSERVER, July 31, 2013, http://campbelllawobserver.com/rip-the-death-of-
publicly-funded-judicial-elections-in-north-carolina/
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and organizations by preventing them from contributing to indepen-
dent campaigns in support of candidates.  For example, in Caperton v.
A.H. Massey Coal Company, the defendant company’s CEO contrib-
uted a modest sum to a West Virginia Supreme Court candidate’s
campaign committee while the company had a case pending before
the West Virginia Supreme Court.101  Additionally, the company fun-
neled millions of dollars into a successful independent campaign on
that candidate’s behalf.102  If West Virginia had a public financing sys-
tem in place it could have prevented the harmless direct contribution,
assuming the candidates agreed to accept public funding in exchange
for their promise not to accept private contributions.  But public fi-
nancing could have done nothing to prevent the multi-million-dollar
independent campaign that tainted the West Virginia Supreme
Court’s decision.
As long as the U.S. Supreme Court defines protectable “speech” to
include offering financial support to judicial candidates, public financ-
ing systems will not reduce the perceived influence of special interest
money in judicial races.  That said, burying public finance systems may
be premature.  One recent study of public financing in North Carolina
found that supreme court justices aligned their votes with the prefer-
ences of interest groups that campaigned independently on their be-
half less frequently after public financing was introduced.103  This
implies that public funding creates psychological distance between
judges and their supporters that may weaken their bond.
2. Disclosure
Disclosure rules promote openness in government by forcing do-
nors to reveal themselves and how much they donated.  The utility of
disclosure rules, however, is limited in two ways.  First, thanks to the
vagaries of campaign finance laws, campaign supporters can evade
disclosure requirements by organizing themselves as non-profit, social
welfare organizations, which are not required to disclose their do-
nors.104  Second, to the extent such statutory gaps can be filled, it may
be unduly optimistic to hope that ordinary voters will become aware
101. 556 U.S. 868, 873 (2009).
102. Id.
103. Morgan L. W. Hazelton et al., Does Public Financing Affect Judicial Behavior? Evidence
From the North Carolina Supreme Court, 44 AM. POL. RES. 587 (2016).  It bears emphasis, how-
ever, that the sample size of this study was small, and that the introduction of public financing
coincided with the state’s move from a partisan to a non-partisan selection system.
104. Paul Blumenthal, This Dark Money Group is Spending Big on Judicial Elections, and No
One Knows Why, HUFFINGTON POST, Nov. 3, 2016, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/dark-
money-judicial-races-center-for-individual-freedom_us_581b5234e4b0c43e6c1e740d.
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of such disclosures in any but the most vigorously contested judicial
campaigns, where outrageous expenditures buy attack advertising that
trumpets the sources of an opposing candidate’s support.
3. Disqualification
Disqualification, in turn, is no panacea.  The ABA Judicial Division
has thwarted efforts to amend the Model Code of Judicial Conduct to
require disqualification when a judge receives significant independent
campaign support from an individual or organization affiliated with a
party who appears before that judge.105  The official explanation is
that judges in the Judicial Division regard disqualification under such
circumstances a matter of procedure rather than ethics, which has no
place in the Model Code.  Such a position is difficult to square with
the existing Code, which already requires judges to disqualify them-
selves from cases in which they have received direct contributions
from parties or lawyers in excess of amounts that states specify.  Re-
gardless of whether support is direct or independent, the ethical prob-
lem is essentially the same when  judges preside over cases in which a
party or lawyer has lent excessive support to the judge’s election
campaign.
Judges depend on campaign support to win elections, but interested
individuals and groups lose their incentive to support the campaigns
of like-minded candidates if such support will disqualify those candi-
dates from hearing the cases those individuals and groups want the
candidates to decide.  However, state supreme courts with hotly con-
tested elections exhibit a continued reluctance to disqualify judges
that hear cases of interest to their benefactors.
Moreover, disqualification is a means to address perception
problems after they arise and does nothing to prevent those problems
from arising in the first place.  A pair of scholars has found that dis-
qualification does not restore public confidence in the impartiality of
the disqualified judge, which suggests that disqualification does not
cure the taint that impartiality-damaging conduct creates.106
To show that disqualification is no cure-all, however, is not to show
that disqualification is useless.  Even if disqualification does not re-
store public confidence generally, it improves the confidence of par-
105. For a candid and sometimes acrimonious discussion of the events described in this para-
graph, see Charles Geyh et al., The State of Recusal Reform, 18 N.Y.U J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y.
515 (2015).
106. James Gibson & Gregory Caldeira, Campaign Support, Conflicts of Interest, and Judicial
Impartiality: Can Legitimacy of the Courts Be Rescued by Recusal? 74 J. POL. 1 (2012).
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ties and their counsel, who would otherwise have their cases heard by
a judge whose impartiality was in doubt.
III. WHY EVERYONE IS WRONG AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT
Part II catalogued the array of flaws and exaggerations made by
disputants in the judicial selection debate.  Some make arguments pre-
mised on factual assumptions that are unsupported by data, and are
based instead on anecdotes or the authors’ signature blend of what
they deem common sense. Others rely on data generated by others,
cherry pick the “good” data that supports their claims, and ignore the
facts that undercut their position.  Still others, who generate their own
data, frame their research questions in ways that effectively ensure
answers supportive of their arguments.  Still other researchers an-
nounce conclusions putatively drawn from their data, which are dubi-
ous extrapolations of their factual findings molded to fit their
preferred policy conclusions.
The economist Ronald Coase has written that “[i]f you torture the
data long enough, it will confess.”107  In this Part of the Article, I offer
several explanations for why participants in judicial selection show-
downs have tortured or disregarded the data in pursuit of their norma-
tive agendas.  I conclude with some prescriptions to address the
problems.
A. Explanations
1. Path Dependence and Competing Narratives
Participants in the debates summarized tend to employ one of two
distinct narratives.  The law narrative claims that judges are different
from public officials in the other “political” branches of government.
If afforded independence from the electorate, the law narrative posits,
judges will make decisions on the basis of operative facts and law,
rather than the whims of voters or the preferences of campaign sup-
porters.  Hence, appointed judiciaries are best.  The politics narrative
claims, in contrast, that judges are politicians in robes.  If rendered
independent from the electorate, the politics narrative asserts that
judges will make decisions on the basis of their own political or ideo-
logical preferences, rather than operative facts and law or the public’s
policy preferences.  Hence, elected judiciaries are best.
The legal and political science communities both seek to understand
and explain the decisions and conduct of judges and other public offi-
107. RONALD H. COASE, ESSAYS ON ECONOMICS AND ECONOMISTS (1994).
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cials.  Members of the legal community have opted into a culture that
takes law seriously and believes law is of central relevance to the
choices judges make.  Members of the political science community, in
contrast, have immersed themselves in a culture that takes politics se-
riously and conceptualizes judges as political actors whose legal rul-
ings can best be explained in political terms.  As a consequence, when
it comes to judicial selection, law professors, judges, and lawyers tend
to align themselves with the law narrative.  Political scientists and pub-
lic officials without legal backgrounds tend to exhibit greater sympa-
thy for the politics narrative.
The allegiance that disputants show for their preferred narrative
may be attributable, at least in part, to what political scientists call
“path dependence.”  Path dependence proceeds from the premise that
“what happens at an earlier point in time will affect the possible out-
comes of a sequence of events occurring at a later point in time.”108
Historical practice emerges over time to shape the thinking of deci-
sion-makers in ways that structure and limit the conclusions they are
willing to reach.  In that way, paths of analysis that an institution de-
velops can become ruts that limit their perceived options. Path depen-
dence emerged as a way to explain the constraints under which
institutions operate.  Two scholars, not coincidentally both law profes-
sors and political scientists, have argued that the disciplinary divide
between the legal and political science communities is attributable to
a form of path dependence, which has complicated the ability of either
community to see beyond the confines of their own paths, learn from
the other, and seek common ground.109
Participants in the judicial selection debate are not limited to mem-
bers of the law and political science camps.  But those camps frame
the issues for the public debate, and to that extent perpetuate a false
dichotomy that renders consensus elusive.
2. Motivated Reasoning and Assimilation Bias
Participants in the judicial selection debate may subconsciously in-
terpret and resolve gaps and ambiguities in the applicable facts in
favor of whichever system of judicial selection they prefer.  To under-
stand how this works, I bring a better-studied analog into play: how
judges subconsciously interpret gaps and ambiguities in applicable
108. William Sewell, Three Temporalities: Toward an Eventful Sociology, THE HISTORIC
TURN IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 245, 262–63 (Terrence MacDonald ed., 1996).
109. Eileen Braman & J. Mitchell Pickerill, Path Dependence in Studies of Legal Decision-
Making, IN WHAT’S LAW GOT TO DO WITH IT?: WHAT JUDGES DO, WHY THEY DO IT, AND
WHAT’S AT STAKE 114 (Charles Gardner Geyh ed., 2011).
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facts and law to favor case outcomes that align with their ideological
preferences.
Political scientists who study judges have developed an “attitudinal
model” of judicial decision making, which has shown how judges are
influenced by their attitudes or ideological predilections.110  They
have made that showing by coding parties and issues that come before
the courts with reference to whether judicial rulings in favor of a given
party on a given issue would yield a liberal or conservative outcome.
Then, researchers compare those outcomes to the ideological orienta-
tion of the deciding judges.  In the federal system, where most of this
research has been conducted, a judge’s ideological orientation is de-
termined with reference to the party affiliation of the president who
nominated them, together with other information available at the time
of the judge’s appointment.  In the U.S. Supreme Court, which an-
swers to no higher court and has a docket limited to a small number of
divisive and often politically charged cases, the influence of a justice’s
ideological orientation on case outcomes is profound.  The impact of
ideological influence declines in the lower courts, but is still
significant.
An inference one could draw from this data is that federal judges
are politicians in robes, who willfully disregard the law and issue rul-
ings that further their ideological agendas to the extent they can get
away with it.  But judges emphatically and categorically deny that this
is so, and swear allegiance to the rule of law—which means either that
judges categorically are bald-faced liars who consciously violate their
oaths of office at every opportunity, or something else is going on.
One plausible alternative inference is that judges engage in “moti-
vated reasoning,” by subconsciously favoring legal arguments that res-
onate with their policy predilections when the operative facts or law
are ambiguous enough to render the correct outcome unclear.111  In
easy cases, when the law and facts are clear, ideology plays less of a
role, which helps to explain why attitudinal influences are less pro-
nounced in lower courts.  In hard cases, however, when the law or
facts are ambiguous and the judge is confronted with two plausible
legal arguments in support of opposite conclusions, the judge must
make a judgment call as to which argument is correct or best.  In such
cases, the judge must bring her background, education, experience,
common sense, and legal philosophy to bear in deciding which argu-
110. SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 9.
111. For a thorough analysis of motivated reasoning in the context of legal reasoning, see
EILEEN BRAMAN, LAW, POLITICS AND PERCEPTION: HOW POLICY PREFERENCES INFLUENCE LE-
GAL REASONING (2009).
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ment is the winner.  Accordingly, that conservative and liberal judges
would reach different conclusions in close cases is thus unsurprising
and is completely consistent with the proposition that judges give us
their best assessment of what the law requires.  But there is no deny-
ing that ideology influences their assessments in these cases at the
margins.
The same may be true of social scientists, law professors, and others
who think and write about how judges should be selected.  We swear
allegiance to facts, data, and science, much as judges swear to uphold
the law.  Confronted with two plausible judicial selection arguments in
opposition, disputants are subconsciously motivated to resolve uncer-
tainties in favor of arguments compatible with their preexisting atti-
tudes. It is akin to what cognitive psychologists call “assimilation
bias,” in which people are predisposed to assimilate new information
in ways that are consistent with their previously held views.112
Data shows judges sentence criminal defendants more harshly when
elections are impending.  Election proponents assimilate this data by
thinking of sentencing as a form of policy-making that should take the
views of the public into account.  Thus, they believe the data shows
that elections work magnificently.  Election opponents assimilate this
same data by thinking of sentencing as a form of legal judgment that is
corrupted by voters who pressure judges to make popular choices.
Thus, the data shows that elections are an abomination.
Research corroborates the common-sense suspicion that scholars
are subject to the influence of biases akin to motivated reasoning.113
Motivated reasoning may also help explain occasional departures
from “path dependence,” discussed in the preceding Section.  For ex-
ample, insofar as merit selection systems are suspected to produce
more liberal judges than election systems,114 conservative groups
within the legal community may be motivated to support partisan
election systems.  In a similar vein, judges who prevail in states with
contested elections may be predisposed to extol the wisdom of the
electorate that selected them and support contested elections.  In this
way, motivated reasoning can trump the path dependent predisposi-
tion of lawyers to embrace the law narrative and the appointive sys-
tems that the legal profession otherwise tends to prefer.  Conversely,
112. Charles G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior
Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCH. 2098
(1979).
113. Robert J. MacCoun, Biases in the Interpretation and Use of Research Results, 49 ANNUAL
REVIEW OF PSYCHOLOGY (1998).
114. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 49.
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political scientists who value procedural justice and worry about the
impact of judicial elections on the litigating public, as distinguished
from the voting public, may part ways with the politics narrative that
path dependent social scientists are apt to favor.115
3. Coping with Cognitive Dissonance
The persistence of unyielding arguments for judicial appointments
and elections in light of evidence that such arguments are exaggerated
and wrong may also be the result of a coping mechanism to relieve
what psychologists call “cognitive dissonance.”116  Confronted with
new information that contradicts their view on judicial selection, dis-
putants resolve the resulting dissonance by discounting or ignoring the
new information and crediting tenuous arguments compatible with
their views.
Cognitive dissonance and motivated reasoning are related, in that
both are means by which people reconcile competing claims in light of
their preexisting perspectives.  But motivated reasoning is a finer tool
that leads people to analyze legitimate ambiguities between compet-
ing factual claims and resolve those ambiguities by subconsciously
favoring claims that coincide with whichever method of judicial selec-
tion they prefer.  Cognitive dissonance is a blunter instrument that
leads people to maintain allegiance to their preferred method of selec-
tion by disregarding or marginalizing contradictory information.
Thus, for example, when a study produces conclusions that support
one side in the judicial selection scrum, those conclusions are often
accepted uncritically by those whose argument the study helps.  That
same study creates cognitive dissonance among disputants on the
other side and is either ignored or scoured for flaws and rejected out
of hand when flaws are identified.
4. Dueling Publics
Without focusing on it consciously, disputants often view judicial
selection from the perspective of different audiences.  Election propo-
nents usually take the perspective of the general or voting public,
whose confidence in judges is affirmed by democracy-promoting, ac-
countability-enhancing elections.  Election opponents, conversely,
take the perspective of the litigating public, whose confidence in the
judiciary is diminished when judges’ perceived need to remain popular
115. See, e.g. Robert Hume, Legitimacy, Yes but at What Cost?, 96 JUDICATURE 209 (2013).
116. LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957).
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with the electorate is in tension with their duty to make fair and inde-
pendent decisions under law.
Disagreements arise when disputants confuse or conflate these pub-
lics.  For example, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor argues that, “elec-
tions . . . threaten the public’s perception of judicial independence”
because “[i]f I [knew] I was litigating before a judge who received . . .
money from my opponent, I would not think I was getting a fair
shake.”117  Social scientists dismiss O’Connor’s concern by pointing to
survey research of the general public, which shows that the legitimacy-
damaging impact of money in judicial races does not offset the legiti-
macy-enhancing benefits of judicial elections overall.118  But this
counterpoint misses the mark because O’Connor is speaking about
the perceived legitimacy of courts in relation to the litigating public,
rather than the voting public.  Research finds that litigants accept ad-
verse court rulings as long as they feel they received a fair hearing.119
These studies  give credence to O’Connor’s concern that a litigant
might doubt the fairness of a proceeding in which the judge received
significant campaign support from her opponent—an inference cor-
roborated by survey data showing that 90% of the public thinks that
judges should not preside over cases involving their campaign
contributors.120
By the same token, generalizing about the voting public’s percep-
tion of judicial elections with reference to the litigating public’s per-
ception is likewise ill-advised.  For example, the litigating public may
look askance at a judge who commits to deciding a case in a particular
way while campaigning.  The voting public, in contrast, may have no
problem with judicial candidates announcing their views on issues
they are likely to decide as judges, and regard the practice as a benign
and useful means for voters to educate themselves about the
candidates.
117. Elaine E. Bucklo & Jeffrey Cole, Thoughts on Safeguarding Judicial Independence: An
Interview with Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, 35 LITIG. 6, 8 (2009).
118. GIBSON, supra note 32 (finding that judicial elections produce a net gain for legitimacy);
Woodson, supra note 79 (finding that judicial elections can undermine legitimacy in extreme
cases).
119. Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Perceived Injustice in Defendants’ Evaluation of Their Court-
room Experience, 18 L. & SOC’Y REV. 51, 69–70 (1984); TOM TYLER ET AL., SOCIAL JUSTICE IN A
DIVERSE SOCIETY 82–83 (1997).
120. ADAM SKAGGS, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, BUYING JUSTICE: THE IMPACT OF CITI-
ZENS UNITED ON JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 4 (2010), http://www.brennancenter.org/page/-/publica-
tions/BCReportBuyingJustice.pdf?nocdn=1.
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5. Prescriptions
The key to reform lies in coming to terms with these chronic imped-
iments to agreement, which turns on a two-fold realization.  First, we
can approach consensus by taking steps to diminish the influence of
these impediments.  Cognitive dissonance can be confronted and man-
aged; disputants can be brought to the table and convinced to discard
those arguments that are demonstrably counterfactual and wrong.
Additionally, one can mitigate the effects of motivated reasoning by
being alerted of its presence.  Reform agendas can consciously seek to
better accommodate law and politics narratives for the benefit of both
general and litigating publics.  Elective systems can include features
that afford greater judicial independence for the benefit of the litigat-
ing public and the rule of law.  Appointive systems can include fea-
tures that enhance judicial accountability for the benefit of the general
public and the judiciary’s political legitimacy.
Second, while we can approach consensus, we can never actually
achieve it.  States can make accommodations that narrow the divide
between elective and appointive systems, but cannot eliminate that
divide altogether because a state must ultimately choose to hold its
judges accountable to the electorate or not.  That choice exposes a
conundrum at the core of American government: judicial indepen-
dence from electoral accountability is simultaneously in tension with
and essential to democracy. Independence and accountability are so
related that they have rightly been described as “different sides of the
same coin.”121  But when it comes to judicial selection and whether to
elect or appoint, it is not possible to devise a system in which both
sides of that coin turn face up on the same toss.
For these reasons, judicial selection issues should be understood as
a chronic condition to be managed, rather than a disease to be cured.
The first step toward managing this chronic condition is to pursue a
course of deep interdisciplinarity.  In an ancient Asian folktale, blind
men misdescribe an elephant by generalizing from whichever part of
the animal each touch.  And so it is with those who study the judicial
selection elephant.  The judges, lawyers, law professors, political
scientists, historians, psychologists, journalists and assorted policy
wonks who think about judicial selection each bring their respective
disciplines to bear.  Each has useful perspectives to offer that are in-
complete in isolation, but when taken together yield a composite that
is closer to accurate.  Deep interdisciplinarity diminishes path depen-
121. Stephen Burbank, The Architecture of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 315, 339
(1999).
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dence by promoting trade, rather than warfare, between the law and
politics narratives.  By better informing those narratives with the les-
sons of history, psychology, and anthropology, deep interdisciplinarity
will weaken the hold of simplistic and strident binary claims by adding
nuance and depth that can diminish the conceptual conflicts that give
rise to cognitive dissonance.
A second step is to seek out middle ground that makes judges in
elective systems more independent and judges in appointive systems
more accountable.  This would make binary choices less stark, facili-
tating incremental, intra-system reform when the political will for sys-
temic change is absent.  Electoral systems can lessen the threats they
pose to independence and impartiality by holding elections less fre-
quently, pursuing campaign finance reform, and implementing more
rigorous disqualification regimes.  Appointive systems can institute
measures to make judges more accountable via periodic and meaning-
ful performance evaluation processes, and better publicized recourse
to disciplinary processes for judicial misconduct.
As deep interdisciplinarity narrows the divide between the law and
politics camps, it becomes possible to think past incremental reform
and contemplate new selection systems that better accommodate the
concerns of all involved.  For example, one might revisit an idea I first
suggested in 2003, in which supreme court candidates prequalified by
commission are chosen by the electorate in contested elections, for a
single, lengthy term.  This “qualified election” model has the potential
to offer the legitimacy-enhancing benefits of a contested election,
paired with a safety net to ensure that unqualified candidates are ex-
cluded from the pool.  The threats electoral systems pose to judicial
independence in the form of judges being overly beholden to voters
and campaign supporters is diminished by the elimination of re-selec-
tion processes.  Once elected, judges will be dependent for their ten-
ure on no one.  Disqualification processes will be available to
ameliorate residual problems that arise when a judge’s campaign con-
duct undermines her impartiality.  At the same time, the damage that
rogue judges can do once elected is controlled by term limits and dis-
ciplinary processes.  I do not propose this alternative as optimal.
Rather, it is simply illustrative of approaches that states can consider
when impediments to consensus weaken.
A third step is to acknowledge that ultimate failure to achieve con-
sensus is inevitable—and perhaps that is a good thing.  The competing
values underlying the choice between elective and appointive systems
will remain in constructive and perpetual tension despite best efforts
to make both systems better and diminish the distance between them.
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Moreover, the unavoidably binary character of the election versus ap-
pointment choice and the consequent inability to reach universal con-
sensus may be a virtue, rather than a vice.  It gives states the flexibility
to accommodate changing times, changing circumstances, and chang-
ing legal cultures in different jurisdictions by keeping variations of two
viable selection alternatives on the table.  Which alternative is optimal
will depend on which selection system’s values take precedence in a
given place at a given time.
IV. CONCLUSION
In choosing between elective and appointment systems, my views
have softened over the years, but my preferred default position re-
mains with appointive systems.  An appointive system is most compat-
ible with the role of the judiciary in America’s brand of representative
democracy, at least when the courts are in good public standing.  The
three branches of government wield separate powers capable of keep-
ing the others in check.  The judiciary’s distinctive role is best pre-
served if it can interpret operative law and decide cases in a unique
voice that is not auto-tuned by the same popular pressures that drive
the decision-making of the elected branches of government.
The peril of an appointive system is that the judiciary can lose its
legitimacy if the general public suspects judges are abusing their inde-
pendence and going rogue.  That is far from inevitable: public confi-
dence in judiciaries of states that appoint their judges can be stable
and strong.  Additionally, it is no answer to quote survey data showing
that the public regards elected judiciaries as more legitimate, if other
problems associated with elected judiciaries offset the incremental
gains to perceived legitimacy that elections supply.
That said, the judiciary depends on continued legitimacy.  In a rep-
resentative democracy, all branches of government require the sup-
port and acquiescence of the governed.  This is particularly true of the
judiciary, which lacks the executive branch’s power to enforce court
orders and the legislative branch’s power to appropriate revenue for
court operations.  Without legitimacy, the judiciary is helpless to
thwart defiance of its decisions.  Hence, there comes a tipping point,
where the public ceases to trust judges or those who appoint judges,
and therefore adding an element of electoral accountability is neces-
sary to preserve or restore legitimacy.  At that tipping point, the de-
fault must yield to an elective system.  For states that have opted for
elective systems, the question then becomes when a return to the de-
fault position is justified.  Here, the tipping point occurs when the per-
ceived impact of elections on the litigating public and the rule of law,
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including the perception that justice is for sale in privately financed
judicial campaigns, is adverse enough to outweigh the benefits of elec-
toral accountability.  At that point, departure from the default posi-
tion is justified.
